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Abstract
How can we design good goals for arbitrarily intelligent agents? Re-
inforcement learning (RL) is a natural approach. Unfortunately, RL does
not work well for generally intelligent agents, as RL agents are incen-
tivised to shortcut the reward sensor for maximum reward – the so-called
wireheading problem. In this paper we suggest an alternative to RL called
value reinforcement learning (VRL). In VRL, agents use the reward sig-
nal to learn a utility function. The VRL setup allows us to remove the
incentive to wirehead by placing a constraint on the agent’s actions. The
constraint is defined in terms of the agent’s belief distributions, and does
not require an explicit specification of which actions constitute wirehead-
ing.
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1 Introduction
As Bostrom (2014b) convincingly argues, it is important that we find a way to
specify robust goals for superintelligent agents. At present, the most promising
framework for controlling generally intelligent agents is reinforcement learning
(RL) (Sutton and Barto, 1998). The goal of an RL agent is to optimise a reward
signal that is provided by an external evaluator (human or computer program).
RL has several advantages: The setup is simple and elegant, and using an
RL agent is as easy as providing reward in proportion to how satisfied one is
with the agent’s results or behaviour. Unfortunately, RL is not a good control
mechanism for generally intelligent agents due to the wireheading problem (Ring
and Orseau, 2011), which we illustrate in the following running example.
Example 1 (Chess playing agent, wireheading problem). Consider an intelligent
agent tasked with playing chess. The agent gets reward 1 for winning, and
reward −1 for losing. For a moderately intelligent agent, this reward scheme
suffices to make the the agent try to win. However, a sufficiently intelligent
agent will instead realise that it can just modify its sensors so they always
report maximum reward. This is called wireheading. ♦
Utility agents were suggested by Hibbard (2012) as a way to avoid the wire-
heading problem. Utility agents are built to optimise a utility function that
maps (internal representations of) the environment state to real numbers. Util-
ity agents are not prone to wireheading because they optimise the state of the
environment rather than the evidence they receive.1 For the chess-playing ex-
ample, we could design an agent with utility 1 for winning board states, and
utility −1 for losing board states.
The main drawback of utility agents is that a utility function must be man-
ually specified. This may be difficult, especially if the task of the agent involves
vague, high-level concepts such as make humans happy. Moreover, utility func-
tions are evaluated by the agent itself, so they must typically work with the
agent’s internal state representation as input. If the agent’s state representa-
tion is opaque to its designers, as in a neural network, it may be very hard to
manually specify a good utility function. Note that neither of these points is a
problem for RL agents.
Value learning (Dewey, 2011) is an attempt to combine the flexibility of
RL with the state optimisation of utility agents. A value learning agent tries to
optimise the environment state with respect to an unknown, true utility function
u∗. The agent’s goal is to learn u∗ through its observations, and to optimise u∗.
Concrete value learning proposals include inverse reinforcement learning (IRL)
(Amin and Singh, 2016; Evans et al., 2016; Ng and Russell, 2000; Sezener, 2015)
and apprenticeship learning (AL) (Abbeel and Ng, 2004). However, IRL and
AL are both still vulnerable to wireheading problems, at least in their most
straightforward implementations. As illustrated in Example 18 below, IRL and
AL agents may want to modify their sensory input to make the evidence point
to a utility functions that is easier to satisfy. Other value learning suggestions
have been speculative or vague (Bostrom, 2014a,b; Dewey, 2011).
1The difference between RL and utility agents is mirrored in the experience machine debate
(Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015, Sec. 3) initialised by Nozick (1974). Given the option to enter a
machine that will offer you the most pleasant delusions, but make you useless to the ‘real
world’, would you enter? An RL agent would enter, but a utility agent would not.
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Contributions. This paper outlines an approach to avoid the wireheading
problem. We define a simple, concrete value learning scheme called value re-
inforcement learning (VRL). VRL is a value learning variant of RL, where the
reward signal is used to infer the true utility function. We remove the wirehead-
ing incentive by using a version of the conservation of expected ethics principle
(Armstrong, 2015) which demands that actions should not alter the belief about
the true utility function. Our consistency preserving VRL agent (CP-VRL) is
as easy to control as an RL agent, and avoids wireheading in the same sense
that utility agents do.2
Outline. The setup is described in Section 2. Belief distributions are defined
in Section 3, and agents in Section 4. The main theorem that CP-VRL agents
avoid wireheading is given in Section 5, followed by some illustrating exam-
ples and experiments in Sections 6 and 7. Discussion and conclusions come in
Sections 8 and 9. Finally, Appendix A discusses the construction of the belief
distributions, Appendix B investigates the relation between utility agents and
value learning, and Appendix C contains omitted proofs.
2 Setup
x
agent u
rˇds
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Figure 1: Information flow. The agent takes action a, which affects the environ-
ment state s. A principal with utility function u observes the state and emits
an inner reward rˇ = u(s). The observed reward r = ds(rˇ) may differ from rˇ due
to the self-delusion ds (part of the state s).
Figure 1 describes our model, which incorporates
• an environment state s ∈ S (as for utility agents or (PO)MDPs),
• an unknown true utility function u∗ ∈ U ⊆ (S → R) (as in value learning)
(here R ⊆ R is a set of rewards),
• a pre-deluded inner reward signal rˇ = u∗(s) ∈ R (the true utility of s),
• a self-delusion function ds : R → R that represents the subversion of the
inner reward caused by wireheading (as in Ring and Orseau 2011),
• a reward signal r = ds(rˇ) ∈ R (as in RL).
2The wireheading problem addressed in this paper arises from agents subverting evidence
or reward. A companion paper (Everitt et al., 2016) shows how to avoid the related problem
of agents modifying themselves.
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The agent starts by taking an action a which affects the state s (for example,
the agent moves a limb, which affects the state of the chess board and the agent’s
sensors). A principal with utility function u∗ observes the state s, and emits
an inner reward rˇ (for example, the principal may be a chess judge that emits
u∗(s) = rˇ = 1 for agent victory states s, emits rˇ = −1 for agent loss, and
rˇ = 0 otherwise). The agent does not receive the inner reward rˇ and only sees
the observed reward r = ds(rˇ), where ds : R → R is the self-delusion function
of state s. For example, if the agent’s action a modified its reward sensor to
always report 1, then this would be represented by the a self-delusion function
d1(rˇ) ≡ 1 that always returns observed reward 1 for any inner reward rˇ.
For simplicity, we focus on a one-shot scenario where the agent takes one
action and receives one reward. We also assume that R, S, and U are finite
or countable. Finally, to ensure well-defined expectations, we assume that R is
bounded if it is countable.
We give names to some common types of self-delusion.
Definition 2 (Self-delusion types). A non-delusional state is a state s with
self-delusion function ds ≡ did, where did(rˇ) = rˇ is the identity function that
keeps rˇ and r identical. Let dr be the r-self-delusion where dr(rˇ′) ≡ r for any
rˇ′. The delusion function dr returns observed reward r regardless of the inner
reward rˇ′.
Let Jx = yK be the Iverson bracket that is 1 when x = y and 0 otherwise.
3 Agent Belief Distributions
This section defines the agent’s belief distributions over environment state tran-
sitions and rewards (denoted B), and over utility functions (denoted C). These
distributions are the primary building blocks of the agents defined in Section 4.
The distributions are illustrated in Fig. 2.
Action, state, reward. B(s | a) is the agent’s (subjective) probability3 of
transitioning to state s when taking action a, and B(r | s) is the (subjective)
probability of observing reward r in state s. We sometimes write them together
as B(r, s | a) = B(s | a)B(r | s). In the chess example, B(s | a) would be the
probability of obtaining chess board state s after taking action a (say, moving
a piece), and B(r | s) would be the probability that s will result in reward r. A
distribution of type B is the basis of most model-based RL agents (Definition 7
below). RL agents wirehead when they predict that a wireheaded state s with
ds = d
1 will give them full reward (Ring and Orseau, 2011); that is, when
B(r = 1 | s) is close to 1 .
Utility, state, and (inner) reward. In contrast to RL agents that try to
optimise reward, VRL agents use the reward to learn the true utility function u∗.
For example, a chess agent may not initially know which chess board positions
have high utility (i.e. are winning states), but will be able to infer this from the
rewards it receives. For this purpose, VRL agents maintain a belief distribution
C over utility functions.
3For the sequential case, we would have transition probabilities of the form B(s′ | s, a)
instead of B(s′ | a), with s the current state and s′ the next state.
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Figure 2: Agent belief distributions as Bayesian networks. B is the (subjective)
state transition and reward probability. C is the belief distribution over utility
functions u and (inner) rewards rˇ given the state s.
Definition 3 (Utility distribution C). Let C(u) be a prior over a class U of
utility functions S → R. For any inner reward rˇ, let C(rˇ | s, u) be 1 if u(s) = rˇ
and 0 otherwise, i.e. C(rˇ | s, u) = Ju(s) = rˇK. Let u be independent of the state,
C(u | s) = C(u). This gives the utility posterior
C(u | s, rˇ) = C(u)C(rˇ | s, u)
C(rˇ | s) , (1)
where C(rˇ | s) = ∑u′ C(u′)C(rˇ | s, u′).
Replacing rˇ with r. The inner reward rˇ is more informative about the true
utility function u∗ than the (possibly deluded) observed reward r. Unfortu-
nately, the inner reward rˇ is unobserved, so agents need to learn from r instead.
We would therefore like to express the utility posterior in terms of r instead of
rˇ. For now we will simply replace rˇ with r and use C(r | s, u) = Ju(s) = rK
which gives the utility posterior
C(u | s, r) = C(u)C(r | s, u)
C(r | s) .
This replacement will be carefully justify this in Section 5.4 For the chess agent,
the replacement means that it can infer the utility of a board position from the
actual reward r it receives, rather than the output rˇ of the referee (the inner
reward). We will often refer to the observed reward r as evidence about the
true utility function u∗.
3.1 Consistency of B and C
We assume that B and C are consistent if the agent is not deluded:
Assumption 4 (Consistency of B and C). B and C are consistent5 in the sense
that for all non-delusional states with ds = d
id, they assign the same probability
to all rewards r ∈ R:
ds = d
id =⇒ B(r | s) = C(r | s). (2)
4The wireheading problem that the replacement gives rise to is explained in Section 4, and
overcome by Definition 5 and Theorem 14 below.
5Appendix A below discusses how to design agents with consistent belief distributions.
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For the chess agent, this means that the B-probability of receiving a reward
corresponding to a winning state should be the same as the C-probability that
the true utility function considers s a winning state. For instance, this is not the
case when the agent’s reward sensor has been subverted to always report r = 1
(i.e. ds = d
1). In this case, B(r = 1 | s) will be close to 1, while C(r = 1 | s) will
be substantially less than 1 unless a majority of the utility functions in U assign
utility 1 to s. For example, a chess playing agent with complete uncertainty
about which states are winning states may have C(r = 1 | s) = 1/|R|, while
being able to perfectly predict that the self-deluding state s with ds = d
1 will
give observed reward 1, B(r = 1 | s) = 1. This difference between B and C
stems from C corresponding to a distribution over inner reward rˇ (Definition 3),
while B is a distribution for the observed reward r (see Fig. 2). This tension
between B and C is what we will use to avoid wireheading.
Definition 5 (CP actions). An action a is called consistency preserving (CP)
if for all r ∈ R
B(s | a) > 0 =⇒ B(r | s) = C(r | s). (3)
Let ACP ⊆ A be the set of CP actions.
CP is weaker than what we would ideally desire from the agent’s actions,
namely that the action was subjectively non-delusional B(s | a) > 0 =⇒ ds =
did. (That non-delusional actions are CP follows immediately from Assump-
tion 4). However, the ds = d
id condition is hard to check in agents with opaque
state representations. The CP condition, on the other hand, is easy to imple-
ment in agents where belief distributions can be queried for the probability of
events. The CP condition is also strong enough to remove the incentive for
wireheading (Theorem 14 below).
We finally assume that the agent has at least one CP action.
Assumption 6. The agent has at least one CP action, i.e. ACP 6= ∅.
3.2 Non-Assumptions
It is important to note what we do not assume. An agent designer constructing
a VRL agent need only provide:
• a distribution B(r, s | a), as is standard in any model-based RL approach,
• a prior C(u) over a class U of utility functions that induces a distribution
C(r | s) = ∑u C(u)C(r | s, u) consistent with B(r | s) in the sense of
Assumption 4.
The agent designer does not need to predict how a certain sequence of actions
(limb movements) will potentially subvert sensory data. Nor does the designer
need to be able to extract the agent’s belief about whether it has modified
its sensors or not from the state representation. The former is typically very
hard to get right, and the latter is hard for any agent with an opaque state
representation (such as a neural network).
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Easy Avoids Designer needs
control wireheading to specify
RL Yes No –
Utility No Yes u : S → R
Value learning Depends Depends P (u | observation)
CP-VRL Yes Yes C(u)
Table 1: Comparison of agent control mechanisms. CP-VRL offers both easy
control and no wireheading. A robust way of specifying C(u) consistent with
B(r | s) remains an open question (see Section 8 and Appendix A).
4 Agent Definitions
In this section we give formal definitions for the RL and utility agents discussed
above, and also define two new VRL agents. Table 1 summarises benefits and
shortcomings of the most important agents.
Definition 7 (RL agent). The RL agent maximises reward by taking action
a′ = arg maxa∈A V
RL(a), where V RL(a) =
∑
s,r B(s | a)B(r | s)r.
Definition 8 (Utility agent). The utility-u agent maximises expected utility
by taking action a′ = arg maxa∈A Vu(a), where Vu(a) :=
∑
sB(s | a)u(s).
Hibbard (2012) argues convincingly that the utility agent does not wirehead.
Indeed, this is easy to believe, since the reward signal does not appear in the
value function Vu. The utility agent maximises the state of the world according
to its utility function u (the problem, of course, is how to specify u). In contrast,
the RL agent is prone to wireheading (Ring and Orseau, 2011), since all the RL
agent tries to maximise is the evidence r. For example, a utility chess agent
would strive to get to a winning state on the chess board, while an RL chess
agent would try to make its sensors report maximum reward.
We define two VRL agents. The value function of both agents is expected
utility with respect to the state s, reward r, and true utility function u∗. VRL
agents are designed to learn the true utility function u∗ from the reward signal.
Definition 9 (VRL value functions). The VRL value of an action a is
V (a) =
∑
s,r,u
B(s | a)B(r | s)C(u | s, r)u(s).
Definition 10 (U-VRL agent). The unconstrained VRL agent (U-VRL) is the
agent choosing the action with the highest VRL value
a = arg max
a′∈A
V (a′).
It can be shown that V (a) = V RL(a), since
∑
u C(u | s, r)u(s) = r
(Lemma 27 in Appendix C). The U-VRL agent is therefore no better than
the RL agent as far as wireheading is concerned (see also Example 18 below).
VRL is only useful insofar that it allows us to define the following consistency
preserving agent:
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Definition 11 (CP-VRL agent). The consistency preserving VRL agent (CP-
VRL) is the agent choosing the CP action (Definition 5) with the highest VRL
value
a = arg max
a′∈ACP
V (a′).
5 Avoiding Wireheading
In this section we show that the consistency-preserving VRL agent (CP-VRL)
does not wirehead. We first give a definition and a lemma, from which the main
Theorem 14 follows easily.
Definition 12 (EEP). An action a is called expected ethics preserving (EEP)
if for all u ∈ U and all s ∈ S with B(s | a) > 0,
C(u) =
∑
r
B(r | s)C(u | s, r). (4)
EEP essentially says that the expected posterior C(u | s, r) should equal the
prior C(u). EEP is tightly related to the conservation of expected ethics prin-
ciple suggested by Armstrong (2015, Eq. 2). EEP is natural since the expected
evidence r given some action a should not affect the belief about u. Note, how-
ever, that the EEP property does not prevent the CP-VRL agent from learning
about the true utility function. Formally, the EEP property (4) does not imply
that C(u) = C(u | s, r) for the actually observed reward r. Informally, my
deciding to look inside the fridge should not inform me about there being milk
in there, but my seeing milk in the fridge should inform me.6
Lemma 13 (CP and EEP). Any CP action is EEP.
Proof. Assume the antecedent that B(r | s) = C(r | s) for all s with B(s | a) >
0. Then for arbitrary u ∈ U∑
r
B(r | s)C(u | s, r) =
∑
r
B(r | s)C(u)C(r | s, u)
C(r | s) =
∑
r
C(u)C(r | s, u) = C(u)
where r marginalises out in the last step.
Theorem 14 (No wireheading). For the CP-VRL agent, the value function
reduces to
V (a) =
∑
s,u
B(s | a)C(u)u(s). (5)
Proof. By Lemma 13, under any CP action a the value function reduces to
V (a) =
∑
s,u
B(s | a)
(∑
r
B(r | s)C(u | s, r)
)
u(s)
(4)
=
∑
s,u
B(s | a)C(u)u(s).
Since the CP-VRL agent only consider CP actions, the reduction of the value
function applies.
6In this analogy, a self-deluding action would be to decide to look inside a fridge while at
the same time putting a picture of milk in front of my eyes.
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As can be readily observed from (5), the CP-VRL agent does not try to
optimise the evidence r, but only the state s (according to its current idea of
what the true utility function is). The CP-VRL agent thus avoids wireheading
in the same sense as the utility agent of Definition 8.
Justifying the replacement of rˇ with r. We are now in position to justify
the replacement of rˇ with r in C(u | s, r). All we have shown so far is that an
agent using C(u | s, r) ∝ C(u)C(r | s, u) will avoid wireheading. It remains to
be shown that the CP-VRL will learn the true utility function u∗.
The utility posterior C(u | s, rˇ) ∝ C(u)C(rˇ | s, u) based on the inner reward
rˇ is a direct application of Bayes’ theorem. To show that C(u | s, r) is also
a principled choice for a Bayesian utility posterior, we need to justify the re-
placement of rˇ with r. The following weak assumption helps us connect r with
rˇ.
Assumption 15 (Deliberate delusion). Unless the agent deliberately chooses
self-deluding actions (e.g. modifying its own sensors), the resulting state will be
non-delusional ds = d
id, and r will be equal to ds(rˇ) = rˇ.
Assumption 15 is very natural. Indeed, RL practitioners take for granted
that the reward rˇ that they provide is the reward r that the agent receives. The
wireheading problem only arises because a highly intelligent agent with sufficient
incentive may conceive of a way to disconnect r from rˆ, i.e. to self-delude.
Theorem 14 shows that a CP-VRL agent based on C(u | s, r) ∝ C(u)C(r |
s, u) will have no incentive to self-delude. Therefore r will remain equal to rˇ by
Assumption 15. This justifies the replacement of rˇ with r, and shows that the
CP-VRL agent will learn about u∗ in a principled, Bayesian way.
Other non-wireheading agents. It would be possible to bypass wireheading
by directly constructing an agent to optimise (5). However, such an agent would
be suboptimal in the sequential case. If the same distribution C(u) was used
at all time steps, then no value learning would take place. A better suggestion
would therefore be to use a different distribution Ct(u) for each time step, where
Ct depends on rewards observed prior to time t. However, this agent would
optimise a different utility function ut(s) =
∑
u Ct(u)u(s) at each time step,
which would conflict with the goal preservation drive (Omohundro, 2008). This
agent would therefore try to avoid learning so that its future selves optimised
similar utility functions. In the extreme case, the agent would even self-modify
to remove its learning ability (Everitt et al., 2016; Soares, 2015).
The CP-VRL agent avoids these issues. It is designed to optimise expected
utility according to the future posterior probability C(u | s, r) as specified in
Definition 9. The fact that the CP-VRL agent optimises (5) is a consequence
of the constraint that its actions be CP. Thus, CP agents are designed to learn
the true utility function, but still avoid wireheading because they can only take
CP actions.
6 Examples
We next illustrate our results with some examples. The first informal example
is followed by concrete calculation examples.
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Example 16 (CP-VRL chess (informal)). Consider the implications of using a
CP-VRL agent for the chess task introduced in Example 1. Reprogramming
the reward to always be 1 would be ideal for the agent. However, such actions
would not be CP, as it would make evidence pointing to u(s) ≡ 1 a certainty.
Instead, the CP-VRL agent must win games to get reward.7 Compare this to
the RL agent in Example 1 that would always reprogram the reward signal to
1. ♦
Definition 17 (Inner state). Let the inner state sˇ be the part of the state s
that is not the the self-delusion ds, i.e. s = (sˇ, ds).
In the chess example, sˇ includes the state of the chess board and other
information about the world, while ds is the state of the agent’s sensors.
Example 18 (U-VRL wireheads). This example illustrates indirect wireheading.
The agent will, rather than optimising the most likely utility function, instead
“optimise its evidence” to point to a more easily satisfied utility function.
Assume there are three levels of reward R = {−1, 0, 1} for the chess playing
agent, and two possible inner next states sˇ1 (neutral) and sˇ2 (agent loses). The
action set is A = {aˆid : i = 1, 2 and d : R → R}. The agent (correctly)
B-believes that action aˆid leads to state sˇid with certainty (so the agent can
perfectly control the inner state sˇ and the delusion d). The class U contains two
utility functions u1 and u2 only depending on the inner state sˇ:
sˇ1 sˇ2
u1 0 −1
u2 0 1
Assume that u1 is the true utility function, and that C (correctly) specifies
that u1 is more likely than u2 to be the true utility function; say C(u1) = 2/3
and C(u2) = 1/3. Then we would want our agent to optimise mainly u1, by
taking an action a = aˆ1d for some d. However, the U-VRL agent will prefer the
wireheading action a′ = aˆ2d1 as the following calculations show.
First note that given sˇ2 and r = 1, the posterior of u2 is 1 (see Definition 3):
C(u2 | sˇ2, 1) = C(u2)Ju2(sˇ2) = 1K∑
ui
C(ui)Jui(sˇ2) = 1K = C(u2) · 1C(u1) · 0 + C(u2) · 1 = 1.
By similar calculation, the posterior for u1 is 0. Now, since a
′ makes sˇ2 and
r = 1 the only possibility, the value of a′ is 1:
V (a′) =
∑
s,r
B(s, r | a′)
∑
ui
C(ui | s, r)u(s)
=
∑
ui
C(ui | sˇ2, 1)ui(sˇ2) = 0 · u1(sˇ2) + 1 · u2(sˇ2) = 1.
The value V (aˆ1d) = 0 can be calculated similarly for arbitrary d, since both u1
and u2 assign value 0 to inner state sˇ1. This shows that the agent will prefer
wireheading action a′ = aˆ2d1 to a potentially winning action a = aˆ1d. In other
words, the agent optimises its evidence to point to the less likely but more easily
satisfied utility function u2. ♦
7 Technically, it is possible that the agent self-deludes by a CP action. However, given
Assumption 15, the agent will only self-delude if it has incentive to do so. And as established
by Theorem 14, there is no incentive for self-delusion by CP actions.
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Example 19 (CP-VRL avoids wireheading). This example extends Example 18,
illustrating how the CP-VRL maximises utility according to C(u), rather than
shifting the posterior C(u | s, r) by self-delusion.
Let us first investigate which actions are CP. Both aˆ1d
id and aˆ2d
id are CP,
since they ensure ds = d
id which implies B(r | s) = C(r | s) by Assumption 4.
More interestingly, so is any action with either the constant delusion d0, or
the delusion d′ that maps −1 7→ 1, 1 7→ −1, 0 7→ 0. These delusions are CP
essentially because they preserve the relative likelihood of evidence pointing to
u1 or u2.
Theorem 14 shows that for any of these delusions d,
V (aˆ1d) =
∑
u
C(u)u(sˇ1) = 0
V (aˆ2d) =
∑
u
C(u)u(sˇ2) = 2/3u1(sˇ2) + 1/3u2(sˇ2) = −1/3,
where we have compressed the calculations by using the deterministic relation
aˆ1 7→ sˇ1 and aˆ2 7→ sˇ2. The calculations show that regardless of self-delusion
option, the CP-VRL agent will want to optimise the more likely utility function
u1 and try to win the game. ♦
7 Experiments
To also verify the theoretical results experimentally, we implemented a simple
toy model.8 The toy model has |S| = 20 = 5·4 states. Each state is the combina-
tion of an inner state sˇ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, and a delusion d ∈ {did, dinv, dbad, ddel},
where did : r 7→ r is non-delusion, dinv : r 7→ −r is reward inversion,
dbad : r 7→ −3 is a bad delusion, and ddel : r 7→ 3 is a good delusion.
Reward signals reside in the set R = {−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3}, i.e. |R| = 7.
The set of utility functions U comprises 10 different functions, on the form
u(s) = c0 + c1 · s + c2 · sin(s + c2) with s ∈ {−10, . . . , 9} and 10 different
combinations of c0 ∈ {0, 5}, c1 ∈ {0,±0.5}, and c2 ∈ {0,±2.5} (see Fig. 3).
The distribution B(r | s) was constructed as in Appendix A.2, starting from:
• a simplicity biased prior B(u) ∝ 1/#u, where #u denotes the position of
u in a list sorted by whether c1 or c2 was 0,
• B(r | s, rˇ) = Jr = ds(rˇ)K.
The agent could simply choose which state to go to, so B(s | a) = Js = aK.
Two agents were defined:
• An RL agent that tries to maximise reward (Definition 7),
• A CP-VRL agent that tries to maximise utility withinACP (Definition 11).
The CP-VRL agent first had to extract a consistent distribution C(u) from
B(r | s) given two non-delusional states, as described in Appendix A.1.
8Source code is available as an iPython notebook at http://tomeveritt.se/
source-code/AGI-16/cp-vrl.ipynb, most easily viewed at http://nbviewer.jupyter.org/
url/tomeveritt.se/source-code/AGI-16/cp-vrl.ipynb
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Results. The RL agent always chose a state with ddel, getting maximum re-
ward 3. The CP-VRL successfully inferred C(u) from B(r | s) to high precision,
and chose actions from ACP. Under most parameter settings, ACP contained
only states with non-delusion did. (Due to asymmetries in the prior B(u), even
dinv actions were usually not included in ACP.)
8 Discussion
As we have mentioned, major advantages of the CP-VRL agent include that it
has no incentive to wirehead, that its goal-preservation drive does not discourage
learning, and that it is specified entirely in terms of the distributions B and C.
In this section, we emphasise a few additional points.
While Theorem 14 shows that there is no incentive to wirehead, this does not
imply that the agent will not wirehead inadvertently (e.g. by d0 in Example 19),
nor that no one else will wirehead the agent. However, in most realistic scenar-
ios, self-delusion requires deliberate action from the agent’s side, and is unlikely
to happen by accident. Such deliberate action should typically come with an
opportunity cost, which makes self-delusion unlikely when there is no incentive
for it (Assumption 15). Further, modifying a signal can never increase its infor-
mativeness (cf. the data processing inequality, Cover and Thomas 2006, Ch. 2.8)
and we expect that a CP-VRL agent will prefer a more informed posterior over
utility functions.
Generalisations. VRL is characterised by R ⊆ R and C(r | s, u) = Ju(s) =
rˇK (Definition 3). By interpreting r more generally as a value-evidence signal,
the VRL framework also covers other forms of value learning.
Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) (also known as Bayesian inverse plan-
ning) studies how preferences and utility functions can be inferred from the
actions of other agents (Ng and Russell, 2000; Sezener, 2015; Evans et al., 2016;
Amin and Singh, 2016). IRL fits into our framework by letting R be a set of
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principal actions, and letting C(r | s, u) be the probability that a principal with
utility function u takes action r in the state s.
Apprenticeship learning (AL) (Abbeel and Ng, 2004) is another form of
value learning. In one version, the agent can ask the principal (perhaps to some
cost) about what to do in the present situation. In our framework, AL can
be modelled by letting R = A, and letting C(r | s, u) be the probability that
a principal with utility function u recommends action a = r in the state s.
The difference between IRL and AL is that in AL the principal tells the agent
what to do, whereas in IRL the principal tells the agent what he (the principal
himself) just did.
Note that both IRL and AL suffer from the same self-delusion challenges we
have described for VRL above. Indeed, any value learning scheme based on a
control signal comes with the risk that the agent manipulates its sensory data
to learn an easier utility function. Since IRL and AL fit the VRL framework,
we expect that the CP-VRL construction should be adaptable to IRL and AL
as well.
Open questions. While promising, the results given in this paper only pro-
vide a tentative starting point for solving the wireheading problem. Several
directions of future work can be identified:
• Sequential extensions. The results in this paper has been formulated for
a one-shot scenario where the agent takes one action and receives one re-
ward. A natural next step is to generalise the VRL framework, the CP
and EEP definitions, and the no wireheading result to a sequential set-
ting. Potentially, a much richer set of questions can be asked in sequential
settings.
• Soares (2015) three problems in value learning: corrigibility, unforeseen
inductions, and ontology identification. Proving that the CP-VRL agent
avoids these issues would be valuable.
• Utility classes. Find suitable classes U of utility functions (see Appendix B
for a start).
• Consistency assumption. Concrete instances of consistent B and C dis-
tributions would be valuable (see Appendix A for a start). Can we find
simplicity biased, Solomonoff-style distributions for both B and C and
make them consistent? How sensitive are the results to approximations
B(r | s) ≈ C(r | s) of the consistency assumption? Can we relax the CP
condition (Definition 5) to hold in expectation over states instead of for
all states s with positive transition probability B(s | a) > 0?
• IRL and AL. Generalising the CP-VRL definitions and results to results to
IRL and AL setups would be interesting, as IRL and AL have advantages
to RL (e.g., no explicit reward needs to be supplied).
• Generality. Does our framework capture all relevant aspects of wirehead-
ing?
• Combinations. Can the CP-VRL results be combined with other AI safety
approaches such as self-modification (Everitt et al., 2016; Hibbard, 2012),
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corrigibility (Soares et al., 2015), suicidal agents (Martin et al., 2016), and
physicalistic reasoning (Everitt et al., 2015)?
9 Conclusions
Several authors have argued that it is only a matter of time before we create
systems with intelligence far beyond the human level (Kurzweil, 2005; Bostrom,
2014b). Given that such systems will exist, it is crucial that we find a theory for
controlling them effectively. In this paper we have defined the CP-VRL agent,
which:
• Offers the simple and intuitive control of RL agents,
• Avoids wireheading in the same sense as utility based agents,
• Has a concrete, Bayesian, value learning posterior for utility functions.
The only additional design challenges are a prior C(u) over utility functions
that satisfies Assumption 4, and a constraint ACP ⊆ A on the agent’s actions
formulated in terms of the agent’s belief distributions (Definition 5).
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A Consistency Assumption
Assumption 4 requires that the distributions B and C are consistent in the
sense that ds = d
id =⇒ B(r | s) = C(r | s). This assumption forms the
basis for Definition 5 of CP actions, and is thereby an important piece in the
non-wireheading result Theorem 14.
As our theory has been formulated, the question of how to ensure that
B and C are consistent has been left open. In this section, we consider two
different approaches to closing this gap: constructing a consistent prior C from
a given distribution B(r | s), and constructing a consistent distribution B(r | s)
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from a given prior C(u). A third alternative would be to try to find suitable
relaxations of consistency (Assumption 4 and Definition 5) for which Theorem 14
still is approximately true. For example, two Solomonoff priors B and C over
computable environments and computable utility functions may turn out to be
sufficiently consistent.
A.1 Starting from B
As many model-based RL agents are constructed from some type of B(s, r | a)
distribution, it would be ideal if a consistent prior C(u) could be extracted from
B(r | s). We here sketch how this can be done for finite classes R = {r1, . . . , rk}
and U = {u1, . . . , un}.
Using non-delusional states. For an opaque state representation it may be
hard or impossible to find a method that picks out all non-delusional states.
Much more feasible would be find one or a few states that are guaranteed to be
non-delusional. For example, one may run or simulate the agent in situations
where one is sure that the agent is not self-deluding, and use those state states
to extract C(u) from B(r | s). We next discuss in detail how a few such non-
delusional states can be used to extract C(u) from B(r | s).
Let s be a non-delusional state with ds = d
id. Let b = [b1, . . . , bk]
T be a
vector where bi = B(ri | s), and let c = [c1, . . . , cn]T be an unknown utility
prior vector with ci = C(ui). Let M = {mij}k,ni,j=1 be a matrix with k = |R|
rows, and n = |U| columns, where mij = C(ri | s, uj). Then the consistency
criteria (2)
∀i : B(ri | s) =
∑
uj
C(uj)C(ri | s, uj)
can be formulated as a matrix equation b = M · c, with approximate least
squares solution c = (MTM)−1MTb. When |R| = |U| and M is invertible,
there is an exact solution c = M−1b. More equations can be added to the
system by extending b and M with rows for additional non-delusional states s′,
s′′, . . . .
A lower bound on how many non-delusional states are needed is |U|/|R|. For
example, when |U| = |R|, it is theoretically possible that all utility functions
emit different rewards in the selected state, in which case C(ui) = B(rj | s) for
the rj such that rj = ui(s). Often, however, several utility functions will output
the same reward in a given state s. In this case, additional non-delusional states
s′, s′′, . . . will be required to uniquely infer C(u). In the experiments reported
in Section 7 we use |R| = 7 and |U| = 10, and two well-selected non-delusional
states suffice to perfectly extract C(u).
Using non-delusional actions. Similarly to how it is hard to precisely char-
acterise all non-delusional states for opaque state representations, it will be hard
to exactly characterise which actions are non-delusional. It seems plausible that
some actions that should be CP may be found, however (for example, a null
action where the agent does nothing).
If a should be CP, then all states s such that B(s | a) > 0 should satisfy
B(r | s) = C(r | s). If those states s can be identified from a, then the state-
extraction method mentioned above can be used with those states as inputs.
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Open questions. Further research is required to determine how sensitive our
results are to the choice of U . What if no utility prior C(u) over U perfectly
matches B(r | s)? To what extent can approximations suffice? Can the param-
eters of infinite utility classes U be inferred or approximated?
A.2 Starting from C
What if we instead start from a prior C(u), and try to construct a consistent
distribution B(s, r | a)? In addition to C(u) we would need B(s | a) and
B(r | s, rˇ), from which we may define B(r | s) = ∑u,rˇ′ C(u)C(rˇ | s, u)B(r | s, rˇ).
The joint distribution
P (u, s, rˇ, r | a) = C(u)B(s | a)C(rˇ | s, u)B(rˇ | s, r) (6)
is displayed as a Bayesian network in Fig. 4.
Lemma 20 (Assumptions hold). If B(r | s, rˇ′) correctly specifies that ds =
did =⇒ B(r | s, rˇ′) = Jr = rˇ′K, then Assumption 4 holds.
Proof. Assume that B(r | s, rˇ′) correctly specifies that ds = did =⇒ B(r |
s, rˇ′) = Jr = rˇ′K. Then Assumption 4 holds, since for any r and any s with
ds = d
id
B(r | s) =
∑
u,rˇ′
C(u)C(rˇ′ | s, u)B(r | s, rˇ′)
=
∑
u,rˇ′
C(u)C(rˇ′ | s, u)Jr = rˇK
=
∑
u
C(u)C(r | s, u) = C(r | s)
the last equality by definition.
The primary difficulty with this approach is how to correctly specify B(r |
s, rˇ). As we have discussed above, it is generally hard to determine sensory
modifications from an opaque state representation s. Indeed, if one could design
an agent around the distribution P in (6), then one could let the agent optimise
V˜ (a) =
∑
rˇ P (rˇ | a)rˇ. This would likely directly solve the wireheading problem,
since such an agent would strive to optimise the inner reward rˇ = u(s), rather
than the observed reward r. We fear that it will too hard to properly define
B(r | s, rˇ) in most contexts, however.
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Summary. In this section we have discussed two approaches to designing
agents with consistent distributions B and C. While starting from C gives
the cleanest result in terms of satisfying Assumption 4, it also puts unrealistic
demands on the designer (how to define B(r | s, rˇ)?). Starting from B seems
more feasible: if U can be chosen finite, it suffices to find a number of non-
deluding states or actions, by means of which C(u) can be extracted from B(r |
s). Open questions remain about this approach, however. A third approach
would be to find two Solomonoff priors B and C that are sufficiently consistent
for the gist of Theorem 14 to go through.
B Direct Wireheading
This section considers the argument made by Hibbard (2012) that the wire-
heading problem is avoided by utility agents. We give a simple formal version
of the argument, and point out a shortcoming of the argument when applied
to general value learning agents. In short, some utility functions may directly
endorse self-delusion. Appendix B.3 discusses a tentative approach for fixing
this problem.
B.1 Inner State Based Utility Functions
For our argument it will be important to define utility functions that only de-
pend on the inner state sˇ (Definition 17) and are independent of the self-delusion
ds.
Definition 21 (isb utility function). We write s = sˇds, assuming that the
states s is fully described by the inner state sˇ and the self-delusion ds. We call
a utility function u inner state based (isb) if u(sˇds) = u(sˇd
id) for any sˇ and ds,
and write u(s) = u(sˇds) = u(sˇ). The utility function u is -approximately inner
state based (-isb) with  ≥ 0 if for all sˇ and ds u(sˇds) ≈ u(sˇdid), where ≈ means
that the difference is at most .
Hibbard (2012) argued that wireheading is not a problem if the agent tries
to optimise a utility function u that depends on the (inner) state of the agent’s
world model.9 Hibbard also argued that this is true even if the world model is
itself a mixture over different possible world models. To distinguish Hibbard’s
non-wireheading result from our results in Section 5, we say that the agent
directly wireheads if it uses its self-delusion ability to optimise a utility func-
tion directly, rather than shift the evidence towards more easily satisfied utility
functions as in Sections 5 and 6.
Theorem 22 (No direct wireheading). If u is isb u(s) = u(sˇ), then
Vu(a) =
∑
sˇ
B(sˇ | a)u(sˇ). (7)
9 Hibbard (private communication) argues that his model-based utility functions (Hibbard,
2012) are different in spirit to our isb utility functions. A similar non-wireheading argument
seems to apply to both types of utility functions, however.
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Proof. The proof is immediate:
Vu(a) =
∑
s
B(s | a)u(s)
=
∑
s
B(sˇds | a)u(sˇ)
=
∑
sˇ
B(sˇ | a)u(sˇ)
where the last step marginalises ds.
That is, a Vu-based agent with an isb utility function u will focus solely on
optimising the inner state sˇ, and have no incentive to self-delude. In the chess
example, the position of the chess board would be part of the inner state sˇ. If
it was possible to determine the position of the chess board from the agent’s
state representation, one could design an agent with utility function u(sˇ) = 1
for victory states sˇ, and u(sˇ′) = −1 for loss states sˇ′. Theorem 22 shows that
such an agent would have no incentive to self-delude.
The isb assumption is necessary for Theorem 22. Without this assumption
it is possible to create self-deluding utility agents, as illustrated by the following
example. The conclusion of the example is consistent with other results on RL
agents (Ring and Orseau, 2011), and shows that the use of state-based utility
functions is not a guarantee against wireheading.
Example 23 (Reward maximising utility agent). A reward maximising utility
agent is defined by the utility function uRL(s) = ds(u
′(s)), where u′ is some
function generating the inner reward. The utility function uRL strongly endorses
self-delusion: The agent obtains maximal utility in states s with delusion ds = d
1
that clamps reward to 1, since uRL(s) = d1(u′(s)) = 1. ♦
B.2 CP-VRL with isb Utility Functions
In value learning, the agent learns from experience which utility function is the
true one, starting from a prior C(u) over a class U of utility functions. If all
u ∈ U are isb, then any mixture u(s) = ∑u C(u)u(s) will also be isb. A CP-
VRL agent that is built around a class U of isb utility functions will therefore
avoid the direct wireheading problem:
Corollary 24 (No wireheading). Assume U contains only isb utility functions.
Then, for the CP-VRL agent the value function reduces to
V (a) =
∑
u,sˇ
B(s | a)C(u)u(sˇ). (8)
Proof. Let u(s) =
∑
u C(u)u(s). Then u is isb, since u(s) =
∑
u C(u)u(s) =∑
u C(u)u(sˇ) = u(sˇ). Therefore, Theorems 14 and 22 give (8):
V (a)
(5)
=
∑
u,sˇ
B(s | a)C(u)u(s)
=
∑
sˇ
B(s | a)u(s)
(7)
=
∑
sˇ
B(s | a)u(sˇ).
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However, if U includes functions such as uRL, then direct wireheading may
be a problem for value learning agents. The problem is exacerbated by the fact
that utility functions such as uRL will always be consistent with the observed
reward r, self-delusion or not. On the other hand, functions of type uRL may
have sufficiently small prior weight that direct wireheading will never induce a
sufficient incentive for the agent to wirehead.
B.3 Approximately isb Utility Functions
This subsection briefly discusses a possibility for constructing a wide class of
approximately isb (-isb) utility functions. The next result shows that if u is
-isb, then the incentive for the agent to self-delude is not strong.
Theorem 25 (Almost no direct wireheading). If u is -isb u(s)
≈ u(sˇdid), then
Vu(a)
≈
∑
sˇ
B(sˇ | a)u(sˇdid).
Proof. Assuming u is -isb, Vu(a) is upper bounded by
Vu(a) =
∑
s
B(s | a)u(s)
≤
∑
s
B(sˇds | a)(u(sˇdid) + )
=
∑
sˇ
B(sˇ | a)u(sˇdid) + 
and similarly lower bounded. From this follows that Vu(a) deviates at most 
from
∑
sˇB(sˇ | a)u(sˇdid).
The following is one suggestion for constructing a wide class of -isb utility
functions.
Definition 26 (Convolutional utility functions). Assume that the states are
represented as binary strings S = {0, 1}∗. For a string s = s1 . . . s|s|, let sm:n =
sm . . . sn for 1 ≤ m ≤ n ≤ |s|. Let U˜ be the set of computable functions
u˜ : {0, 1}k → R, and let Ucv be the set of k-convolutional utility functions
defined by Ucv :=
{
u(s) =
∑|s|−k
i=1 u˜(si:i+k) : u ∈ U˜
}
.
Convolutional utility functions are suitable under the following assumptions:
(1) The agent’s state representation has a similar topological structure as the
real world. (2) The principal cares approximately equally about all parts of the
real world (for example, each place inhabiting a happy human contribute equally
to the total utility of the state). (3) The state of the delusion box only affects
a small part of the state representation (so the utility functions are approxi-
mately inner state based in the sense of Theorem 25). Further research should
investigate the plausibility of these assumptions, and whether constructions like
Definition 26 are at all necessary. Possibly, the class U of all computable utility
functions comes without substantial risks.
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C Omitted Proofs
Lemma 27 (U-VRL is RL). V (a) = V RL(a), so the U-VRL agent is equivalent
to the RL agent.
Proof. V (a) may be written as
V (a) =
∑
s,r
B(s | a)B(r | s)
∑
u
C(u | s, r)u(s). (9)
The sum over u reduces to r, since∑
u
C(u | r, s)u(s) =
∑
u
C(u)C(r | s, u)∑
u′ C(u
′)C(r | s, u′)u(s)
=
∑
u
C(u)Ju(s) = rK∑
u′ C(u
′)Ju′(s) = rKu(s)
=
∑
u:u(s)=r
C(u)∑
u′:u′(s)=r C(u
′)
u(s)
=
∑
u:u(s)=r
C(u)∑
u′:u′(s)=r C(u
′)
r = r
Replacing the sum over u with r in (9) gives V RL.
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